COMPETING PAYMENT SCHEMES*

This paper presents a model of competing payment schemes. Unlike previous work on generic two‐sided markets, the model allows for the fact that in a payment system, users on one side of the market (merchants) compete to attract users on the other side (consumers, who may use cards for purchases). It analyzes how competition between card associations and between merchants affects the choice of interchange fees, and thus the structure of fees charged to cardholders and merchants. Implications for other two‐sided markets are discussed.     

Bargaining over Interconnection: The Clear-Telecom Dispute

We explore the problem of network interconnection in local telecommunications. We develop a model with a competitive business sector and a regulated residential sector. The model is used to analyze the celebrated New Zealand antitrust case between Clear and Telecom. We discuss implications of the model for the economics of antitrust, including issues of competition versus efficiency and the use of appropriate economic models. We also examine the implications of some proposed rules for interconnection. In particular, we examine reciprocity, 'bill and keep', and the rule that the courts ultimately endorsed, the Baumol-Willig rule.     

A Model of Money and Credit, with Application to the Credit Card Debt Puzzle

Many individuals simultaneously have significant credit card debt and money in the bank. The credit card debt puzzle is as follows: given high interest rates on credit cards and low rates on bank accounts, why not pay down debt? While some economists go to elaborate lengths to explain this, we argue it is a special case of the rate of return dominance puzzle from monetary economics. We extend standard monetary theory to incorporate consumer debt, which is interesting in its own right since developing models where money and credit coexist is a long-standing challenge. Our model is quite tractable—for example, it readily yields nice existence and characterization results—and helps put into context recent discussions of consumer debt.     

Comparaison empirique des méthodes d'inférence de probabilités subjectives*

Résumé. Les méthodes d'inférence de probabilités subjectives que sont l'amplitude directe et la bissection ont été comparées par l'auteur en ce qui a trait à l'exactitude, telle que déterminée par l'environnement (fréquence relative), des probabilités résultant de l'application de ces méthodes et à l'acceptabilité des méthodes d'inférence. Chaque participant à l'expérience a utilisé les deux méthodes et attribué à chacune d'elles une cote d'acceptabilité. L'auteur a mis à la disposition des sujets un logiciel d'inférence interactive, comprenant l'affichage graphique sous forme d'histogramme des probabilités selon les deux méthodes d'inférence, afin de les aider et d'assurer une comparaison plus raffinée des méthodes. Des étudiants de deuxième cycle diplômés en gestion, bien renseignés tant sur le contexte de la tâche que sur les probabilités subjectives, se sont prêtés à l'expérience. L'inférence directe a donné des probabilités subjectives beaucoup plus exactes que la bissection et s'est révélée beaucoup plus acceptable aux yeux des participants.     

Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus

We study a credit market in which multiple lenders sequentially offer financing to a single borrower under moral hazard. We show that restricting lenders to post single offers involves a loss of generality: none of the equilibrium outcomes arising in this scenario survives if lenders offer menus of contracts. This result challenges the approach followed in standard models of multiple lending. From a theoretical perspective, we offer new insights on equilibrium robustness in sequential common agency games.